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The purpose of this thesis is to explore and analyze the process required to
procure foreign non-developmental item (NDI) weapon systems for Special Opera-
tions Forces (SOF). The primary intent is to provide the program manager and other
acquisition professionals with information needed to identify the strengths, weak-
nesses, and validity of acquiring foreign NDI weapon systems. A case analysis,
focusing on the acquisition of the Maritime Air Delivery System (MADS) for
USSOCOM, is utilized to develop recommendations regarding the procurement of
foreign NDI weapon systems for Special Operations Forces. Key issues regarding the
MADS procurement are analyzed within the context of the impediments, challenges
and advantages discussed in the thesis. It was determined that the MADS acquisition
strategy, although not perfect, was sufficient to obtain and test a viable weapon
system while mitigating the risks associated with cost, schedule and performance.
Problems encountered during the process have been identified and organizational and
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The purpose of this thesis is to explore and analyze the process required to
procure foreign non-developmental item (NDI) weapon systems for Special Opera-
tions Forces (SOF). This thesis will provide the program manager and other
acquisition professionals with information needed to identify the strengths, weak-
nesses, and validity of acquiring foreign NDI weapon systems. A case analysis,
focusing on the acquisition of the Maritime Air Delivery System (MADS), will be
utilized to develop recommendations regarding the procurement of foreign NDI for
Special Operations Forces.
B. BACKGROUND
Our National Security Strategy has changed dramatically in the last decade.
No longer do we face a definable, significant threat. The shift in focus from the Cold
War and an overall decrease in the size of the defense budget has forced the
Department of Defense (DoD) to reevaluate the way in which it does business.
Unfortunately, the number of operational commitments (Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia, etc.)
has increased while funding levels have decreased. To counter this imbalance, many
services have been forced to cut costs by decreasing funding levels in the procurement
arena. The DoD is now exploring various acquisition strategies to combat the
shortfalls brought on by the decrease in procurement funding. One strategy that the
DoD is exploring is the increase in the acquisition of foreign NDI weapon systems.
The Special Operations Forces (SOF) budget is only about 1 percent of the
defense budget and has historically not suffered the funding decrements that have
characterized the rest of the forces. "However, that immunity from reduction has
ended. For the 1995-1999 period, SOF RDA (Research, Development and Acquisi-
tion) was reduced $ 1 .3 billion, or 33% from the previous planned levels." (Matthews,
1995, p. 3) Because of these reductions, a major reevaluation of the entire U.S.
Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) modernization program has resulted.
(Matthews, 1995, p. 4) The acquisition of foreign NDI weapon systems may solve
some of the problems brought on by the decrease in funding and increase in
operational pace (OPPACE).
C. THESIS OBJECTIVE
A major objective of acquiring any weapon system for DoD is to get the most
"bang for the buck." Procuring NDI weapon systems from foreign sources is just one
way in which USSOCOM is attempting to outfit its units while combating the
procurement shortfalls brought on by the decrease in funding levels. "A glimpse into
the SOF program shows a change in the RDA share decreased from 40% of MFP
(Major Force Program) 11 in Fiscal Year 1992, to 23% in Fiscal Year 2001."
(Matthews, 1995, p. 4)
The primary objective of this thesis is to explore and analyze the acquisition
process required to procure foreign NDI weapon systems for SOCOM. This will
assist program managers in identifying the strengths, weaknesses, and validity of
procuring foreign NDI weapon systems. The analysis of the Maritime Air Delivery
System (MADS) identifies some of the impediments, challenges and benefits to
procurement as an ongoing SOCOM foreign NDI acquisition. Conclusions and
recommendations based on the analysis of the case are presented. Areas for further
research are identified.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
The primary research question for this thesis is:
1
.
How does the Department of Defense acquire foreign non-develop-
mental item (NDI) weapon systems for Special Operations Forces?
2. Secondary Research Questions:
a. What are the current Governmental acquisition policies and
initiatives affecting the acquisition of foreign NDI weapon
systems?
b. What are the impediments and challenges to the acquisition of
foreign NDI weapon systems?
c. What are the benefits ofacquiring foreign NDI weapons systems
for Special Operations Forces?
d. What role does the Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT)
Program play and has it been successful in this role in the past?
e. What impediments and challenges have occurred in the acquisi-
tion of the MADS? Are they different from those discussed
earlier? Are they specific to this acquisition? How can they be
eliminated or minimized?
f. Have the benefits discussed in the thesis actually occurred? If
not, why? Was the FCT Program utilized for this acquisition,
and if so, what were the benefits and challenges?
g. What are NDI acquisition lessons learned for USSOCOM?
E. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
The thrust of this thesis is to explore and analyze the acquisition process
required to procure foreign NDI (Special Operations-Peculiar) weapon systems for
Special Operations Forces. The first step will be to develop a common foundation of
knowledge by briefly examining the history of both U.S. foreign weapons procure-
ment and NDI procurement, examining the current policies and directives which
affect the acquisition of foreign weapon systems for SOF, and examining USSOCOM
specific acquisition elements (e.g., requirements process, acquisition authority, special
operations peculiar items, etc.). The second step will be to examine the impediments,
challenges and benefits of acquiring foreign NDI weapon systems for SOF. The third
step will be to conduct a case analysis ofthe Maritime Air Delivery System (MADS).
The MADS provides the means to tactically insert a rigid hull inflatable
boat (RIB) into oceans or lakes from a C-130 aircraft without requiring
the aircraft to land. Its British manufacturer, Aircraft Materials Limited
(AML), calls the airdrop device the Platform Universal Rigid Inflatable
Boat Aerial Delivery (PURIBAD) system. The parachute-based system
can accommodate any RIB in the range of 22 to 28 feet in length, with
outboard or inboard engines. (Goodman, 1996, p. 50)
F. RESEARCH LITERATURE AND METHODOLOGY
Literature reviews were conducted and research data was obtained from
official government directives and policies, journals, previous Naval Postgraduate
School theses, Department ofDefense and Army regulations and personal interviews.
Personal interviews were used to provide insight into the current processes and the
future direction of foreign NDI acquisition in Special Operations. Interviews focused
on current acquisition processes regarding foreign NDI weapon system acquisition
and on specific issues concerning the acquisition ofthe Maritime Air Delivery System
(MADS). A site visit to SOCOM was conducted to collect data and information for
the case analysis.
G. DEFINITIONS/TERMS
Non-Developmental Item - Is a statutory term describing items that have
been previously developed for production. Non-developmental items include:
1. Any previously developed item in use by a federal, state, or local
agency of the U.S. or a foreign government with which the U.S. has a
mutual defense cooperation agreement;
2. Any item described above that requires only minor modification to
meet the requirements of the procuring agency; or
3
.
Any item currently being produced that does not meet the requirements
listed above solely because the item is not yet in use. (Buying
Commercial and NDI: A Handbook, 1996, p. 7)
Special Operations-Peculiar -
Any item or service that is peculiar to SOF. This includes standard
items used by other DoD forces, but modified for SOF; items initially
designed for, or used by SOF, until adopted for use as Service common
by other DoD forces; and items approved for use by CINC/DCINC as
critically urgent for the immediate accomplishment of a SOF mission.
(Ryan, 1996, p. 30)
Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) - "A project that tests and evaluates a
foreign technique, process, or other subset of a system architecture with the intent of
applying that technology to an identified conventional U.S. military system."
(DSMC, Glossary, 1995)
H. ORGANIZATION OF THESIS
Chapter I contains the purpose, background, thesis objectives, primary and
secondary research questions as well as the research scope and methodology.
Chapter II of this thesis develops a common foundation ofknowledge of the
acquisition of foreign NDI weapon systems. It examines the history of both U.S.
foreign weapons procurement and NDI procurement. It also examines current DoD
policies and directives which affect the acquisition of foreign weapon systems for
SOF. Finally, it examines USSOCOM specific acquisition elements.
Chapter III explores the different impediments and challenges to the acquisi-
tion of foreign NDI weapon systems. These include contracting problems, political
implications, logistical challenges, culture and communication problems, test and
evaluation challenges and user requirement issues.
Chapter IV explores the benefits of acquiring foreign NDI weapon systems.
These include decreased time to acquire, cost reduction, risk reduction, test and
evaluation advantages, and the role of the FCT program.
Chapter V contains the analysis ofthe MADS program. It explores the history
of the program, and how it is affected by the stated benefits and challenges. It also
highlights those areas or factors not previously explored which have an impact on the
program.
Chapter VI contains a summary ofthe previous chapters, with an emphasis on
results from the case analysis, and suggests areas for further research.
II. FOUNDATION
A. INTRODUCTION
Several factors can affect the procurement ofa foreign non developmental item
(NDI) for the DoD/USSOCOM. First, any policy, regulation or statute affecting the
broader area ofNDI will, in turn, affect the procurement of foreign NDI. Second, any
policy or regulation that affects foreign procurement/contracting can also affect the
procurement of foreign NDI. And lastly, any policy or regulation that directly
pinpoints foreign NDI affects the procurement of the same. The remainder of this
thesis is predicated on this premise.
The purpose of this chapter is to develop a common foundation of knowledge
of the acquisition of foreign NDI weapon systems. This is accomplished by first
examining the history of U.S. foreign weapon systems procurement. This historical
perspective will provide insight into the policies and statutes enacted by the
Government. Next, the current DoD policies and directives which affect the
acquisition of all NDI weapon systems will be examined to see how they might affect
the procurement of foreign NDI. Although most of these policies and directives do
not directly target foreign NDI, all impact on its procurement. Finally, USSOCOM's
organization and specific acquisition elements will be examined to gain a better
understanding of this unique organization. This sets the stage for the analysis of the
Maritime Air Delivery System (MADS) which is currently being procured by
USSOCOM.
B. POLICIES AFFECTING THE ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN NDI,
1933-1985
There have been restrictions to foreign procurement since the creation of this
country and attempts to open up the foreign marketplace still meet with resistance
from Government agencies, the defense industry, and other special interest groups.
In fact, of all the major western armament producing countries, the U.S. easily has the
most restrictions and barriers to free and open trade. (Hood, 1996) Accordingly, the
Department of Defense (DoD) has favored purchasing domestic products. The
following section focuses on how foreign procurement has been impacted by the Buy
American Act (BAA), the Cold War and membership in the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO).
1. Buy American Act
The cornerstone of the United States international procurement policy is the
Buy American Act (BAA) of 1933. This landmark legislation gives preference to
domestic producers in competition for Government contracts. It requires that those
goods purchased for the use of our armed forces come from U.S. sources. Enacted
during the Great Depression, it received broad acceptance from business groups and
consumers. (Berquist, 1979) "Although its effect has been modified by more recent
actions and agreements, it continues to influence government purchasing decisions
and is often the basis for controversy and litigation over purchase actions." (Sherman,
1991, p. 331)
2. Effects of the Cold War and NATO Formation
Before the passage of the BAA, the War Department procurement agencies
were allowed to acquire equipment and weapons from any low bid source, regardless
of where the item was produced. At that time, the only existing policy addressing
domestic preference was an amendment to the 1 875 Army Appropriation Bill. This
amendment required Government buyers to procure items from domestic sources if
the price and quality of the competing foreign products were equal. (Meister, 1995,
p. 1)
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At the time the BAA was passed, "the results of an as-fought World War and
the exigencies ofthe ensuing 'Cold War' could not be anticipated." (Burt, 1979, p. 5)
After World War II ended, the presence of a militarily superior Soviet Army in
Eastern Europe and the subsequent threat posed by the resulting power vacuum in
Western Europe forced a change in how the U.S. would shape its defense acquisition
policies. The North Atlantic Treaty, signed on 4 April 1949, was the vehicle for that
change. (Burt, 1979, p. 5)
The original twelve members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization
(NATO) signed the treaty in order to "...promote stability and well-being in the North
Atlantic area" and to "unite their efforts for collective defense and for the preservation
ofpeace and security." (Burt, 1979, p. 5) The part ofthe treaty that has relevance for
foreign procurement is Article 3 which states: "...the parties (NATO member
countries), separately andjointly, by means of continuous and effective self help and
mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist
armed attack." (Burt, 1979, p. 5) Also pertinent is the Temporary Council
Committee's determination in 1952 that the interest ofNATO necessitated "correlat-
ing production programs ofmajor end items ofequipment, including aircraft, artillery,
small arms, radar and wireless sets, vehicles, ships and various types of ammunition."
(Burt, 1979, p. 6)
These statements seen to dictate that a cooperative effort for self-defense and
arms production would be initiated by member countries. However, the strength of
the NATO members themselves undermined the need for the collective capacity
called for in the 1949 treaty. The technological and economic advantages ofthe West
over the Soviet Union made it feasible for each country to act independently of the
overall goal ofNATO. This strength permitted each independent nation to place its
own economic interests above the interests of a strong and effective alliance. (Burt,
1979, p. 6)
Initially, the U.S. supplied the majority of weaponry to NATO due to the
extremely poor state of the European arms industry. However, once member
countries developed their own defense industries, they satisfied their own needs and
looked towards exportation. These changes fueled the problems of standardization
and interoperability already experienced within NATO. For example, "...There are
deployed among the NATO military forces today at least 7 basic models of tanks; 23
types ofcombat aircraft;...multiple guns ofdifferent caliber.... Some guns ofthe same
caliber cannot fire the same ammunition; aircraft with diverse ordinance and fuel
requirements can only rearm or refuel at certain airfields." (Burt, 1979, p. 8) Since
NATO defense plans call for mutual support and integration, these impediments were
a major cause for concern to its leaders.
In addition to these impediments, NATO had to worry about the growing
military might ofthe Soviet Union. In the 1950's and 60's, the Soviet Union focused
on building its military power. It increased its defense expenditures at a compound
rate of three to four percent per year for approximately two decades and overcame a
10-1 inferiority in the central strategic balance. This build-up by the Soviet Union
forced NATO to reexamine how it maintained and developed collective capacity to
resist armed attack. NATO could not operate as it did in the past and still maintain
parity with the Soviet Union. (Burt, 1979, pp. 8-9)
To counter these problems, the U.S. and its NATO allies embarked on a policy
of Rationalization/Standardization and Interoperability (RSI) during the 1970's.
"These three terms are used to describe an objective which is expected, once realized,
to result in a significant increase in the ability ofNATO to efficiently defend itself.
(Burt, 1979, p. 2) U.S. Public Law 94-361, passed on July 14, 1976, requires that
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equipment for use by personnel of the Armed Forces of the United States stationed
in Europe under terms of the North Atlantic Treaty should be standardized or at least
interoperable with equipment of other members ofthe North Atlantic Treaty Organi-
zation. (FCT Procedures Manual, 1994, p. i) The Culver-Nunn Amendment of 1977
requires that "The Secretary ofDefense shall, to the maximum feasible extent initiate
and carry out procurement procedures that provide for the acquisition of equipment
which is standardized or interoperable." (Burt, 1979, p. 8) This legislation permits
the Secretary of Defense to waive the BAA when he deems it in the best interest of
the national defense. It also states that the DoD must consider acquisition of foreign
defense articles for use by U.S. Armed Forces, particularly those units operating with
the NATO defense forces. (Burt, 1979, p. 9)
3. Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT)
One way in which the DoD is capitalizing on foreign investments is through
the use of the Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) Program. The FCT Program was
authorized in 1989 and consolidates two earlier OSD managed programs, the Foreign
Weapons Evaluation Program, and the NATO Comparative Test Program, dating
form 1980 and 1986, respectively. (FCT Procedures Manual, 1994, p. 2) The use of
foreign weapon systems allows the U.S. to preserve its own research and development
dollars while capitalizing on notable improvements or advancements made by other
member countries in new weapon systems development. The FCT Program also
supports the U.S. policy of international armaments cooperation, reducing the overall
DoD acquisition costs by facilitating the procurement ofNDI while simultaneously
strengthening U.S. relationships in the international community. (FCT Program,
1996, p. 1) Although a small program in dollars (over 300 FCT projects have been
completed since 1980, resulting in over 60 U.S. procurements worth over 3 billion
dollars), it had the support of the former Defense Acquisition Executive, the
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Honorable Paul G. Kaminski, who mandated that when a "reasonable expectation of
funding for production exists, FCT projects should be undertaken..." (FCT Home-
page, 1996, p. 2)
C. POLICIES AFFECTING THE ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN NDI,
1986-PRESENT
The Commission on Government Procurement first called for the use ofNDI
by the DoD in December 1972. Since that time, there have been numerous commis-
sions, reports, studies, task forces and Process Action Teams (PAT) addressing the
acquisition of NDI. (Trulock, 1995, p. 1) Now, 25 years later, the DoD is finally
implementing and integrating the concept ofNDI into the acquisition process. The
following legislative acts, regulations and other policy directives impact the acquisi-
tion of foreign NDI.
1. Legislation
Congress passed legislation in 1986 requiring the Department ofDefense to
give preference to the acquisition of non-developmental items. The passage of this
legislation was in response to the increasing cost of developing systems, the technical
risk associated with new development, and the increasing time to field systems. With
the use ofNDI however, fielding time is shortened, research and development costs
are decreased, and the associated risks are decreased. "Based on these incentives
...Congress broadened the preference for the acquisition of commercial items to
preference for the acquisition ofnondevelopmental items, coining the term." (Buying
Commercial & NDI, 1996, p. 2)
In the FY 1991 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress designated the
Section 800 Panel to review all the laws affecting DoD procurement "with a view
toward streamlining the defense acquisition process." Chapter 8 of the panel's report
dealt with the far-reaching reforms needed to enhance the acquisition of commercial
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items, both as components to DoD systems and as end items. The results and
recommendations from this review were later incorporated in the Federal Acquisition
Streamlining Act of 1994. (DSMC, 1993, p. 7)
President Clinton signed into law the Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act
(FASA)of 1994 on October 13, 1994. This act implements many of the Section 800
Panel's recommendations regarding the overhaul of the laws governing the DoD
acquisition process. It repeals or modifies more than 225 provisions oflaw that affect
the acquisition system, consistent with the recommendations ofthe Section 800 Panel
and the National Performance Review. (OAGC, 1994, p. 1) "However, FASA
establishes only a framework for simplifying or 'streamlining' the current federal
acquisition process. Most of FASA's sweeping changes will not impact the
contracting process until the act is implemented by extensive regulatory changes in
the FAR." (Acquisition Web, 1996)
Of all the changes made by FASA-94, the new rules for the acquisition ofnon-
developmental items are the most extensive and will have the greatest impact on the
procurement business. These rules will affect most contracting professionals, not just




It allows contractors of commercial items to use their existing quality
assurance systems; prohibits the use of cost type contracts in the
acquisition of commercial items;
2. States that firm fixed price with economic price adjustment type
contracts should be used;
3
.
Requires agencies to conduct market research before soliciting bids and
establishes a clear preference for non-developmental items. (NCMA,
1994, p. 100)
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The most recent legislation to try and limit the impediments to free trade in the
acquisition of defense systems is the McCain Amendment. Sponsored by Senator
John McCain (R-Arizona), a key member of the Senate Armed Forces Committee,
this interim rule allows the Administration to waive provisions in current and
proposed legislation that stipulate that only U.S. components can be used in American
weaponry. However, appropriation restrictions override some ofthe flexibility ofthe
McCain Amendment. This is true for ball and roller bearings and for anchor and
mooring chains. (Hildens, 1997)
2. Other Policy Directives
President Clinton convened the National Performance Review (NPR) study in
March 1993 in an effort to create a more cost efficient Government. The study's final
report, "From Red Tape to Results: Creating a Government That Works Better and
Costs Less," recommended the following concerning NDI acquisition: "Foster
reliance on the commercial market. Change laws to make it easier to buy commercial
items. For example, revise the definition of commercial items. Revise Government
wide and agency regulations and procedures which preclude the use of commercial
specifications." (GAO, 1994, p. 456)
In June 1994, Secretary of Defense William J. Perry signed a memorandum
entitled "Specifications and Standards - A New Way of Doing Business" that
dramatically changes the way the Government will conduct procurement in the future.
The DoD is now directed to "use performance and commercial specifications and
standards in lieu of military specifications and standards, unless no practical
alternative exists to meet the user's needs." (Perry, 1994, p. 1) This major shift or
reversal in policy makes it easier for the DoD to procure NDI.
Secretary of Defense William Cohen strengthened DoD's policy regarding
allied cooperation on defense acquisition programs by supporting the International
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Armaments Cooperative Policy, which took effect on March 23, 1997. The objective
of this policy is to achieve the "deployments and support of standardized equipment
with potential coalition partners and maximize U.S. funds by sharing costs and
achieving economies of scale through cooperative research, development, production
and logistical support." (Inside the Air Force, 1997, p. 3) Cohen stated that the U.S.
has been very successful in international cooperation at the technology end of the
spectrum, but that we needed to "extend this track record of success across the
remainder of the spectrum to include major defense systems." (Inside the Air Force,
1997, p. 3)
3. Regulations
DoD Directive's (DODD) 5000.1 and 5000.2R and the FAR implement the
recent legislative and policy changes mentioned above. In regards to NDI, DODD
5000. 1 and 5000.2R require that NDI market research and analysis be conducted prior
to the commencement of any developmental effort, during the developmental effort
and prior to the preparation of any product description. (Trulock, 1995, p. 5)
Mr. Gaudio, the leader of the FASA Commercial Item Drafting Team, and
Colonel Trowel, a member ofthe same team, state that the FAR, parts 10, 11, and 12,
have been completely revised to emphasize the following regarding NDI:
Every acquisition should begin with a series of steps to address
important questions such as: what general capabilities are available in
the marketplace to satisfy my requirement? Can a non-developmental
item satisfy my requirement? How can I describe my requirement to
maximize both competition and the acquisition of commercial items?
(Gaudio, 1995, p. 12)
This section addressed several key areas that affect the acquisition of foreign
NDI weapon systems. In the next section, the U.S. Special Operations Command
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(USSOCOM) organization and functions will be explored to examine how the
acquisition process is accomplished.
D. USSOCOM SPECIFIC ACQUISITION ELEMENTS
1. Introduction
The Nunn-Cohen Amendment to the 1987 Defense Authorization Act gives
SOF its own distinct budget authorities, and created both the USSOCOM and the
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low-Intensity Conflict
(SO/LIC). (Armed Forces Journal International, 1997, p. 47)
The United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) is one of nine
unified commands in the U.S. military's combatant command structure and is
composed ofArmy, Navy, and Air Force special operations forces (SOF). Its mission
is to support the geographic commanders-in-chief (CINCs), ambassadors and their
country teams, and other government agencies. "USSOCOM prepares SOF to
successfully conduct special operations, including civil affairs and psychological
operations, spanning the entire continuum of operations." (USSOCOM, 1996, p. 1)
USSOCOM tasks are unique among the CINCs. USSOCOM develops the
doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures for SOF forces, develops specialized
courses of instruction, and trains assigned forces and ensures interoperability. It also
has its own program and budget—Major Force Program (MFP)l l~in the FYDP, and
its own research, development, and acquisition organization. (Ryan, 1996)
2. Acquisition Center
Title 10, United States Code, SEC 167 provides the CINC, currently General
Henry H. Shelton, USA, the "authority to acquire special-operations peculiar (SO-
peculiar) equipment, material, services and supplies. The CINC delegates to the
Special Operations Acquisition Executive (SOAE) this authority as the full time
USSOCOM Acquisition Executive." (USSOCOM Directive 70-3, 1993, p. 2) The
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SOAE has the clear authority, responsibility, and accountability established by USD
(A&T) and is the Senior Procurement Executive (SPE) responsible for overseeing all
special operations procurement activities. He reviews and assesses changes to
acquisition programs submitted by program managers, serves as senior procurement
executive, and also serves as principle advisor to the CINC on all matters relating to
acquisition.
USSOCOM emphasizes the following streamlining initiatives to decrease
procurement time and increase the quality of the equipment it receives: maximize
NDI procurement; condense and/or combine the milestone reviews for minor
programs; limit bureaucracy; make SOCOM the procurement agent; emphasize the
rapid prototyping of weapon systems (demo to production); and increase the use of
commercial standards. (Ryan, 1996)
The following is a brief description of the organization of USSOCOM'
S
acquisition arm. (See Figure 1)
• The "Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition
Center (SORDAC) is a multi-disciplinary research, development and
acquisition management support organization providing functional
expertise to the Special Operations Acquisition Executive (SOAE),
Program Executive Officers (PEOs), Program Managers (PMs), and
System Acquisition Managers (SAMs) for USSOCOM MFP-
programs." (USSOCOM Directive 70-1, Section III)
• The PEOs are assigned by the SOAE as the centralized managers of
research, development, acquisition, testing, and fielding of assigned
SO-peculiar programs.
• The Directorate of Procurement "provides contracting support to the
SOAE for acquisition and executive support to the Special Procurement
Executive (SPE). It also provides procurement support for SO-peculiar
equipment, supplies, and services as regulated by the FAR and DFAR"
(USSOCOM Directive 70-1, Section III, i (2)).
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The Operational Test and Evaluation (OT&E) Division for USSOCOM is one
ofsix divisions comprising the J3 (Directorate ofOperations) and was created in 1993
to allow for independent, objective oversight ofOT&E on SOF systems. Its mission
is to "ensure that adequate and realistic operational testing is conducted for new or
modified SOF systems and provides release for SOF use in support of production
decisions." (Ryan, 1996) It is a key player in the establishment of the USSOCOM
acquisition policy, test strategies and operational requirements. This division
specifically oversees OT&E on all SOF systems, develops Memorandum of
Agreements (MOAs) with test agencies, selects operational test agencies and
approves test strategies, and observes the critical operational test activities. (Ryan,
1996) OT&E also works closely with SORDAC for combined Development Test/
Operational Test (DT/OT), Live Fire Test and Evaluation (LFT&E), Joint Test and
Evaluation (JT&E), and Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT).
USSOCOM also has its own Foreign Comparative Testing program office.
Every year, the service's special operations components identify foreign systems or
items that might satisfy a validated SOF requirement. These sponsors submit format-
ted nominations to the USSOCOM FCT office for formal submission to OSD to
compete for limited funds. Each nomination is evaluated against established criteria
(item must be in use or about to be in use, must be "NDI," etc.). The USSOCOM
FCT office then establishes the Memorandum ofAgreement (MOA) with the service
PMs for execution of approved and funded FCTs.
FCTs are planned and executed in coordination with the USSOCOM OT&E
office to address operational effectiveness and suitability requirements. The use of
the FCT program saves development costs, thereby reducing the overall cost of the
program. The following are three programs currently being evaluated by the FCT
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office: Insensitive rocket motor for M72 LAW; Insensitive Munitions for the 84mm
Recoilless Rifle; and the Maritime Air Delivery System (MADS). (Ryan, 1996)
The management of special operations-peculiar programs is accomplished by
the USSOCOM acquisition team under the direction of the SOAE. They identify
feasible alternatives and evaluate them according to cost, schedule, performance, and
supportability. The procedures and methods utilized in the formulation and execution
of an acquisition may differ significantly. The methods and procedures used depends
on the complexity ofthe requirement, the type of acquisition, and the procedures used
by the Service or agency selected for program management. USSOCOM may require
the full range of acquisition programs (ACAT I, II, and III), but the majority of its
programs are ACAT III. USSOCOM's acquisition and technology development
programs consist of the following: (USSOCOM Directive 70-1, Section IV, 12a.,
1993)
1 . Service - Or Agency Managed Programs. "In most cases a Service
shall develop and acquire an ACAT I system for USSOCOM because of the
significant resources required." (USSOCOM Directive 70-1, Section IV, 12c. (1),
1993) It will be funded by USSOCOM using MFP-1 1 funds. The USCINCSOC is
the Milestone Decision Authority (MDA) for ACAT IC programs (he may delegate
authority to the SOAE) and the SOAE is the MDA for ACAT II and III programs
(unless delegated to a PEO). Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities
(TENCAP) and technology development programs may also be executed by a Service
on behalf of USSOCOM. A Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) specific to the
program defines the roles and responsibilities ofthe SOAE, PEO, and PM, along with
the MDA and the ACAT for these programs. (USSOCOM Directive 70-1, Section
IV, 12c. (1), 1993)
20
2. USSOCOM-Managed Programs. Special Operations-peculiar
acquisition technology and TENCAP programs are managed by the SOAE. "The
technology development and TENCAP programs are established at USSOCOM to
allow research and prototyping ofpromising technologies with the potential to satisfy
SO-peculiar requirements." (USSOCOM Directive 70-1, Section IV, 12c. (2), 1993)
The acquisition team from the SORDAC, which includes the various PEO's and
PM's, will develop and acquire these programs. (USSOCOM Directive 70-1, Section
IV, 12c. (2), 1993)
E. SUMMARY
This chapter developed a common foundation ofknowledge in which to better
understand the remainder of this thesis. This knowledge will offer insight to the
impediments, challenges and advantages of procuring foreign NDI which will be
examined in the next two chapters. The overview of USSOCOM's mission and
acquisition organization provides a solid background to understanding some of the
unique aspects of the case analysis of the MADS.
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III. IMPEDIMENTS AND CHALLENGES TO FOREIGN NDI
PROCUREMENT
With an NDI procurement, the user normally gets the item quicker and
cheaper. However, there are many challenges, impediments and risks that must be
identified and managed to ensure that the benefits ofNDI are obtained. This chapter
concentrates on these challenges and impediments by examining the political
implications, dependency problems, contracting-related impediments, logistical
support issues, culture and communication issues, test and evaluation issues, and user
requirement issues that affect foreign NDI acquisition.
A. POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1. Introduction
The problem that the U.S. faces when dealing with procurement objectives,
along with every other nation, is how to protect national security, create and protect
domestic jobs and industries, and maintain international trade. These competing
interests make it difficult for the various agencies and institutions to formulate and
execute a procurement policy that is in the best interest of the U.S. Government and
the DoD.
Current DoD policy encourages competition of defense contracts, to include
foreign competition. The Office of Foreign Contracting believes it is in the best
interest ofthe U.S. to have maximum access to foreign products. US industry, for the
most part, also has the same objective, because they believe the competitiveness of
prime contractors depends upon proposals offering the best product at the best price.
However, some industry sectors, usually the producers of components sold at the
subcontract level, feel threatened by foreign competition. Special interest groups
emerge to reflect these concerns. The affected firms, their employees, and the unions
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representing them rely upon their representatives in Congress to pass legislation
restricting DoD procurement of foreign systems. (Henderson, 1997)
2. Congress
Congress is the major force behind impediments toward free trade.
Remember, "to reach maximum efficiency in carrying out personal objectives,
representing constituent needs, and discharging legislative responsibilities, a Member
(of Congress) must remain in Congress. Therefore, it stands to reason that reelection
is the prime motivator." (Jones, 1996, p. x) The pressure to be reelected sometimes
motivates Congressmen to implement policies favoring purchase ofdomestic products
from domestic sources which may not be in the best interest of the DoD in terms of
competition and availability.
The following list is an example of laws or programs implemented to protect
domestic sources.
• The Balance ofPayments Program (BOP), which restricts the purchase
of foreign end products by the Department ofDefense for use outside
the U.S. ($25,000 threshold);
• The Berry Amendment, which restricts the DoD from purchasing
foreign food, clothing, textiles, and specialty metal ($10,000 threshold);
• The Preference for Domestic Hand Tools, which restricts DoD from
purchasing foreign hand tools. (Sherman, 1995, p. 234)
In addition to these laws are other protectionist measures which get tagged
onto appropriation bills. These measures, like the aforementioned laws, also
decrease the amount of competition, if only temporarily. When the funding for these
appropriations runs out, so does the protectionist measure. However, the measure
may have been in effect long enough to protect a domestic source from foreign
competition during a major program source selection process.
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These measures affect a large segment ofproducts and illustrate how special
interest groups have been able to protect their specific area from foreign competition.
For example, supercomputers, aircraft fuel cells, totally enclosed lifeboat survival
systems and four ton dolly jacks are all protected under various protectionist
measures.
3. Foreign Influence
Foreign lobbies are pressuring Congress to counter isolationist policies. For
example, British Defense Minister Michael Portillo "called on the US to consider a
range of British weapons—including the Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile,
...to meet standing American Military requirements." (Muradin, 1996) He also
pushed for the passage of the McCain Amendment and gained the support of
Secretary ofDefense Bill Perry on this issue. In support of this (and prior to the FY
97 Defense Authorization Bill), Secretary Perry sent a letter to Senator Strom
Thurmond (Chairman, Committee on Armed Services), eliciting support for various
programs, to include the McCain Amendment. (Henderson, 1997)
The results of domestic pressures also affect foreign policy and trade. "These
pressures increase similar pressures in Europe, with the end effect being closed
markets on both sides of the Atlantic, which benefits neither side" (Muradin, 1996).
Recently, Britain has been criticized by its European neighbors for rejecting European
made systems in favor ofmore than $5 billion in American systems. These systems
include the Tomahawk cruise missiles, Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missiles,
the C- 1 30J Hercules transports, and the WAH-64 Westland Apache attack helicopters.
(Muradin, 1996, p. 30) James Arbuthnot, Britian's procurement minister, countered
this criticism by stating that "international procurement must be conducted only on
a best value basis" and that they bought US products because they "offered a
combination of superior quality and affordable cost." He further went on to add that...
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"we do not buy British, we buy the best and that includes inviting a large number of
countries to tender offers. I think it is wrong to go (exclusively) with Europe, I think
it is shortsighted, I think it reduces competition, I think it reduces quality and value
for money." (Muradin, 1996, p. 30)
Arbuthnot also points out that for competition to be fair, markets must be open
and that while the U.S. market is largely closed to British corporations, Britain has
evaluated American arms companies in a fair and objective manner.
However, foreign countries have special interest groups which pressure their
Governments to buy solely domestic products. Again, Arbuthnot, in favor of the
McCain Amendment, states that failure to approve the amendment "would be very
unfortunate (and) the signal it would send to those countries in Europe which press
for European preference would be a confirmation that they were right all along."
(Muradin, 1996, p. 30)
4. Executive Branch
Each administration seeks to present a single, coordinated Executive Branch
position on proposed legislation. However, the Executive Branch also has its own
constituents and special interest groups that have a stake in policies of agencies
outside the DoD. For example, the U.S. Trade Representatives negotiate agreements
affecting the interests of various industrial sectors. The Departments of State and
Commerce administer laws governing the licensing of exports. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) attempts to resolve differences among the agencies
and to coordinate the Administration's position. However, pressures and conflicting
views on proposed legislation within the Executive Branch sometimes inhibit strong
opposition to protectionist legislation. (Henderson, 1997)
When the McCain Amendment went before Conference, the Director of
Defense Procurement (Office of Foreign Contracting) sent information to OMB
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supporting the proposed amendment. However, the Commerce Department opposed
the amendment and relayed this information to OMB. This caused the Executive
Branch to have a non-unified position on this critical issue. (Henderson, 1997)
5. Special Interests
There are powerful special interest groups which do not want the DoD to
procure weapon systems from foreign sources. These groups lobby Congress and the
Executive Branch in support of protectionist measures and polices which support
domestic procurement. For example, a recent article in Defense News states that
"U.S. industry officials say a Pentagon effort (the Foreign Comparative Testing
program) to evaluate foreign military equipment for possible purchase threatens to
erode the U.S. defense industrial base." (Cooper, 1994, p. 26) Another example is
a comment by Mark Rosenker, vice president for public affairs for the Washington
based Electronics Industries Association, referring to the Navy's purchase of a night
vision device from the U.K.: "U.S. industry should be tapped to produce these items
if (industry) is able, in any way, shape or form, even if [industry] is a short period
away from developing these capabilities." (Cooper, 1994, p. 26)
However, these concerns may be invalid according to Eugene Carroll, director
of the Center for Defense Information, a think-tank in Washington concerned with
military issues. Carroll argues that "small, low-end technology (foreign) programs
may stand a chance of being funded.... However, high technology programs will be
stymied by Congress." (Cooper, 1994, p. 26)
6. Program Managers
Program managers are aware of these issues and are very sensitive to the
political realities of defense procurement. They are very aware that Congress holds
the purse strings and has the power to kill or halt funding for any program. In light
of this, a recent guest speaker (a program manager for a major weapons system) at a
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weekly NPS acquisition seminar had a slide that showed the states where components
of his system were made or manufactured. There were over forty states highlighted
on that slide! He, along with the main contractor, is aware of the importance of
having portions of the project (read jobs) in as many states as possible to ensure that
it maintains political support in Congress. In fact, he called it his Congress slide.
Program managers who are procuring foreign systems do not have this advantage.
They must understand that there are potential enemies that may try to derail their
program solely because it is a foreign acquisition. They must be proactive in the
defense of foreign NDI and be able to objectively prove that by using a foreign
system that they are meeting the user's needs in the most timely and cost effective
manner.
B. DEPENDENCY PROBLEMS
"Foreign articles may offer the best technology and processes to solve design
problems. Where non-developmental items are used, foreign dependency may simply
be an inherent feature of such items." (Norton, 1997, p. 36) The concept of foreign
dependency dictates that you must rely on an external element to fulfill certain
requirements. Although there are certain advantages associated with foreign
procurement, the are also dependency risks that must be evaluated by the acquisition
stakeholders. An example of a recent problem associated with dependence on foreign
weapon systems is described below.
During the 1982 Falklands War, France refused to honor the terms of its
contract with Argentina for the delivery of Super Entendard jets and Exocet missiles.
This decision by France had profound consequences for the outcome of the war.
Although Argentina had great success with the Exocet missile (demonstrated by the
sinking of a British naval vessel by a Exocet missile), they were not able to further
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this success due to France's decision. This example illustrates the dire consequences
of dependency on a foreign supplier of military weapon systems. (Norton, 1997,
p. 36)
There are many advantages to utilizing domestic equipment, including greater
familiarity with the equipment by the user and maintainer. Electrical requirements
and connections are interoperable with other equipment and parts and supplies are
unlikely to be immediately compromised by embargo or blockade. Also, the
producers are more likely to be accessible and generally motivated to support the
defense of their country.
With domestic procurement, surge production and equipment modification can
be effected with greater ease than with foreign NDI. Purchasing foreign items negates
these benefits while also presenting the potential for competitors to obtain them as
well, matching capabilities or allowing them to deploy countermeasures.
Procuring weapon systems from foreign sources can also decrease the
experience level of U.S. defense industry engineers and scientists. This is due to the
decrease in the amount ofwork available for them to learn and gain experience (e.g.,
you can't gain experience ifyou don't play in the game). This can have a long term
effect ofhampering the development of future high-technology products. "The ability
to keep up with and even drive emerging technologies will be essential for leadership
in developing the next generation of weapons. These factors still remain significant
in determining the world balance ofpower." (Norton, 1997, p. 36)
Continuous supply is also a problem with foreign systems. A steady supply
of materials may be interrupted by political unrest and labor strife in the supplier
nation. Acts of God or other natural causes can also interrupt the flow of supplies,
along with the man-made delays ofblockades or embargoes. As happened routinely
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in WW II, enemy forces may take active measures to divert or destroy supplies
enroute.
Domestic suppliers are sometimes heavily subsidized by the Government to
sustain production capabilities for critical or unique items. With foreign weapon
systems, the military does not have the ability to influence foreign suppliers to retain
a reconstitution or surge capability. This could affect the U.S.'s ability to respond to
wartime exigencies.
By relying on foreign weapon systems and parts, "a nation can place its armed
forces at a disadvantage, while simultaneously sacrificing long-held principles and
values." (Norton, 1997, p. 37)
C. CONTRACTING CONSIDERATIONS
As noted in the previous section, the large number and complexity of laws and
regulations which govern Government acquisition and contracting can impede the
procurement of foreign weapon systems. Even with the current push for streamlining,
these impediments make it difficult for a foreign company to conduct business with
the U.S. These impediments also exclude many potential suppliers, such that full and
open competition does not occur. This section will explore the challenges associated
with complying with the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) and the Defense
Federal Acquisition Regulation (DFAR), problems associated with payment terms and
exchange rates, and the challenges associated with training the acquisition workforce.
1. FAR/DFAR
Even DoD agencies who wish to acquire foreign goods must deal with many
impediments that adversely affect the normal contracting process. Part 225 of the
DFAR contains specific procedures that must be followed when dealing with foreign
acquisition. These procedures refine those found in the FAR Part 25 and specify how
foreign offers will be treated. To apply the policies and procedures of Part 225, the
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contacting professional analyzes and evaluates offers of foreign end products by
following the following general guidelines: First, he/she must determine whether the
product is restricted by DoD Authorization or Appropriations Acts or DoD policy.
Next, he/she determines whether the U.S. has a Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) or other international agreement with the country. If the product is from a
qualified country, the offer is evaluated under 225.105 and 225.872-4 (currently, there
are only seventeen countries on the list). Next, he/she determines whether the product
is covered by the Trade Agreements Act or the North American Free Trade
Agreement Implementation Act. If it is, he/she evaluates the offer under FAR 25.402
and 225.105. "If the product is not an eligible product, a qualifying country end
product, or a U.S. made end product, purchase of the foreign end product may be
prohibited." (FAR 225.0-2) It is then determined whether the contractor is controlled
by a terrorist nation, and if so, complies with 209.104(g). Lastly, it is determined
how the acquisition can be affected by the Buy American Act and the Balance of
Payments program. Non-qualifying countries must add fifty percent to the price
(including duty). This entire process not only complicates the contracting process, but
severely restricts competition.
2. Payment Terms and Conditions
In any foreign acquisition, several problems may occur due to the method of
payment and the fluctuation ofexchange rates. In many countries, it is customary for
payments to be made prior to work commencing. This conflicts with both the fixed
price and the cost type contract payment schedules utilized by the DoD. With fixed
price contracts, unit price(s) are paid when the items are delivered and accepted.
Progress payments can be authorized for large and long duration contracts, but are
limited to 80 percent of the cost. With cost type contracts, costs are only reimbursed
at regular intervals. (Arnavas, 1996, p. 158) The inflexibility of our payment system
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makes it difficult for foreign companies that depend on up-front capital to conduct
business with the U.S. Government.
There are basically two options for payment; payment in a foreign currency
or payment in US dollars. Unfortunately, exchange rates fluctuate and this causes a
problem in international contracting. For example, assume that the contract is with
a German company, with payment in US dollars, and the dollar strengthens. At the
time of the contract the exchange rate was US $1=DM 1.5, and the cost of the item
was DM 1 million, or $666,666.66. If the dollar strengthens and the exchange rate
is US $1=DM 2, the German company makes a gain ofDM 333,333.33 and the US
Government loses the opportunity cost of the money. (Dobler, 1996, pp. 271-272)
The contracting officer must be aware of this and ensure the contract stipulates the
most advantageous route for the U.S. Government, such as the inclusion of a
conversion rate provision.
D. LOGISTICAL SUPPORT ISSUES
Logistical support issues have always been a problem area for DoD. This
section explores a few of these problem areas and how they relate to foreign NDI
procurement. These include problems caused by the shortened acquisition cycle, the
supportability challenges throughout a product's life cycle, availability and spare
parts, problems associated with Technical Data Packages (TDP), and the cost of
additional design data.
1. Shortened Acquisition Cycle
Logistics is an area with a large potential for disaster and is one ofthe toughest
challenges in NDI acquisition. A major cause is the shortened acquisition cycle for
NDI. Because of this shortened cycle, the logistics planner is under great pressure
from the very beginning of a NDI procurement. Unlike the traditional sequential
development ofa system, the logistical planner is unable to work through the multiple
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logistics pre-production planning steps as the system develops. Instead he/she must
catch up with the abbreviated and deleted phases that create a NDFs rapid
procurement advantage. "All logistical planning actions such as provisioning
conferences, technical data reviews and application for supply part national stock
numbers must be completed as quickly as possible." (Shade, 1996, p. 9)
2. Technical Data Packages
The transition from the original foreign manufacturer production of an item to
a U.S. manufacturer can cause significant problems for the program, (not to mention
extending the procurement timeframe). A major portion of these problems can be
attributed to problems with the transfer of the Technical Data Package (TDP). An
Americanized TDP defines the engineering, production, and logistics support proce-
dures required to ensure the system's acceptable performance, along with defining the
systems design configuration. It contains all pertinent technical data, including
quality assurance provisions, drawings, and packaging details. (Schaller, 1996, p. 41)
Below are a few common problems which occur that make foreign TDP's
unacceptable under U.S. standards:
• The data may be written in a foreign language, which requires that
documents must be translated into English. Information or meanings
may be lost in the translation process.
• The use oftwo different measurement systems (metric and English) can
cause substantial problems in the areas of precise measurements and
tolerance levels. Currently, the U.S. and U.K. are the only two major
armament producing countries which do not consistently use the metric
system.
• Foreign corporations may not understand the demands imposed by the
U.S. in terms ofTDP data required. Some foreign manufacturers use
a "fit at production" philosophy. In this type of production, the
accuracy ofdrawings used on the production floor are less critical than
in a assembly-line type production process. This makes the job of
accurately putting the production process on paper a difficult task. This
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is unacceptable for most U.S. manufacturer's since a critical element of
TDP's is the inclusion of pertinent information so that a production
facility can "produce to the TOP with stringent configuration
management requirements." (Schaller, 1996, p. 42)
Two recent programs that have encountered serious problems due to
inadequate TDP's are the FMTV (Family ofMedium Tactical Vehicles) program and
the M-l 19 105mm Field Howitzer program. In the FMTV program, the inability of
the foreign producer to produce an adequate TDP was the main catalyst in the major
cost and schedule overruns which threatened the survival ofthe program. (Boudreau,
1997) In the Ml 19 program, the delays caused by inadequate TDP's resulted in a two
year delay in scheduled fielding. (Schaller, 1996, p.42)
3. Conclusion
The program manager must recognize the inherent logistical support risks that
are associated with foreign NDI. Given this, "an acquisition decision must not be
made until trade-off factors are identified, analyzed, and compared with other
alternatives." (Buying Commercial and NDI: A Handbook, 1996, p. 38) The logis-
tics planner is the key element in this process and must not only keep the program
manager informed of these issues, but must ensure that logistical issues are well
understood and weighted in the acquisition decision.
E. CULTURE AND COMMUNICATIONS
"The nature, customs, and ethics of individuals and business organizations
from two different cultures can raise a surprising number of obstacles to successful
business relationships." (Dobler, 1996, p. 272) This section focuses on impediments
and challenges that occur in international trade due to the differences in culture and
communication between countries. The challenges incurred with the use of
interpreters, bribery as a part of normal business, and the challenge of knowing your
counterpart will be briefly explored.
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1. Interpreters
Anyone who has used an interpreter knows how difficult, confusing, time
consuming and costly communications can be. Twice the normal time for verbal
communication must be allotted if an interpreter is used, thus driving up cost and
increasing schedule. There may also be differences in terminology between countries.
These differences can create confusion, noncommunication and cause implementation
problems during all phases of the acquisition process, but especially during the
contracting phases.
2. Bribes
Gift giving and bribes are a normal part of business in many cultures, but not
in others. Madeline Albright, the new U.S. Secretary of State, stated that "if an
American businessman or woman bribes a foreign official in return for a contract, that
American is fined or goes to jail. If a European bribes that same official, chances are
he will get a tax deduction." (Defense News, 1997, p. 14) While the U.S. has
policies that regulate our business ethics, other countries don't play the same game.
Because the U.S. chooses not to participate in these activities, it limits the number
and availability of contracting sources.
3. Knowledge
Knowledge and sensitivity about the country and culture which you deal with
is vital to a good working relationship and is a challenge that must recognized and
dealt with by individuals and nations. An example of understanding your foreign
counterpart's differences and developing a plan to deal with these differences was a
challenge faced by the 10th Special Forces Group (Airborne). 10 SFG(A) conducted
training and operations in many European countries where the custom to toast your
friends is an accepted and important part of the culture. The U.S. Army's policy is
that no alcohol is allowed to be consumed during the duty day, but our higher
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headquarters formulated a policy to allow for consumption of limited amounts of
alcohol in certain circumstances. This policy allowed us to toast our friends and
maintain a good working and professional relationship with them. Sometimes these
small things can mean the difference between success and failure. The challenge to
U.S. procurement agencies is how to identify and react to these differences.
F. TEST AND EVALUATION
"The role of test and evaluation in an NDI acquisition is exactly the same as
in a typical developmental/procurement acquisition program." However, the amount
oftest and evaluation required for an NDI acquisition is dependent on several factors.
These include the type ofNDI, the amount and quality of test data available from the
original RDT&E, the similarity of expected use and environment to current use, and
the degree to which the proposed system is currently used. For all procurements, the
purpose of test and evaluation is to "fulfill the basic tenant ofT&E—risk definition."
(Adams, 1992, p. xi) In this section, a few major test and evaluation issues affecting
NDI are explored and evaluated.
1. Risk
There are four major areas of risk concerning the testing of NDI systems
recognized by the U.S. T&E community. First, the requirements may not be fully
understood. Without the correct requirements, it is difficult to ensure that the right
capabilities and aspects of a system are tested and evaluated. Second, if the opera-
tional environment and intended use of the system is not clearly understood, it is
difficult to test with a high degree of confidence. The third area deals with the risk
associated with the definition of system interoperability and interfaces between the
NDI system and the systems it must operate with. "Because an NDI system may have
to operate with a system or within a system that it was not concurrently developed
with, the interfaces and interoperability issues can either falsely disqualify or qualify
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the NDI system." (Adams, 1992, p. xi) Lastly, the NDI test plan and program may
not sufficiently cover documentation and support issues. This may lead a Service to
procure a system that may not be operationally suitable or supportable and which may
require additional development and supportability work in the future. (Adams, 1992,
p.xi)
2. Impediments
Along with the risks, there are also impediments to the actual testing of the
NDI system. Probably the largest problem in testing is the mindset of the testing
community. The majority of their testing is oriented towards traditional development
approaches. The challenge to the program manager is to reorient the thinking of the
test community to consider non-traditional, NDI approaches. Depending on the
systems' previous use, the T&E plan can be modified by deleting redundant testing.
This saves the program manger time and money. (Adams, 1992, p. x) DoD's lack of
experience in commercial test practices and standards is a also an impediment to
streamlined testing. DoD testers must understand the commercial standards product
developers use to test their systems. To avid redundant testing, these can be
considered in lieu of DoD test requirements. (Buying Commercial and NDI: A
Handbook, 1996, p. 56)
The need for specialized support and test equipment may also cause problems
for the program manager. The use of DoD standard test equipment, although
preferred, may not be feasible, and unique test equipment may be required. The need
for new calibration standards and procedures to support the required test equipment
must also be determined. (Buying Commercial and NDI: A Handbook, 1996, p. 46)
The need for properly trained support personnel may also cause problems. If
the system is foreign, U.S. personnel may not have the training required to support the
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testing of the equipment. If the training is available, it may be costly, thus adding
more to the life cycle cost of the system.
The location ofthe testing may also pose problems and the program manager
must consider the following prior to selecting a test location:
* Should the testing be completed at the contractors/host country's
location or should it be tested at a domestic location?
* Will the testing require special arrangements, etc.?
* What limitations would be involved if testing occured at host country
location?
* With a system that has already been fielded by the foreign country, how
does the U.S. confirm their test data? Do we have confidence in it or
do we believe it may be biased?
Lastly, depending on the country, the test operating and support manuals may
be printed in a different language and will have to be translated to conduct the test.
Also, the PM should have at least one interpreter to help with the contract country's
dialogue. All ofthese impediments can be overcome, but all with a price, either time,
money or both.
"The bottom line always should be that the T & E program effectively provides
data and analysis to determine whether or not the NDI system is operationally
effective and suitable in the intended environment." (Adam, 1992, p. xii) To ensure
this happens, the program manager must evaluate the major T&E areas ofrisk and try
to eliminate or minimize most of the impediments to the actual testing.
G. REQUIREMENTS GENERATION
The requirements generation process is possibly the most critical step in any
NDI acquisition. Whether the NDI approach is appropriate or not is largely
dependent on how the requirements document is written. The challenge that the
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procurement officer has is to ensure that he/she is involved early enough in the
requirements generation process to ensure that an NDI solution is possible. The user
may be the expert on the requirement, but is rarely knowledgeable concerning
possible solutions that the marketplace can offer. It is up to the procurement officer
to conduct a thorough market research investigation (to include foreign sources) to
determine what is available to fulfill the user's needs. (Shade, 1996, p. 1 1)
The procurement officer and the user together must formulate a realistic
requirements document that reflects the market conditions. User requirements must
be carefully scoped to ensure that goldplating or unnecessary requirements are not
added onto the base requirements. "We're starting to realize that ifwe want to field
something before it becomes obsolete, then we may have to look at what's already out
there and remain flexible. We can't expect the world and get it off the street."
(Norris, 1995, p. 27) We might not get the most sophisticated weapons, with all the
extras, but we would probably receive a good piece of equipment at a fair price.
(Norris, 1995, p. 27)
There is an old saying in the Army that a good plan executed boldly is much
better that the perfect plan not executed or poorly executed. Foreign NDI can be this
good plan. A good piece of equipment in the hands of the service member is much
preferred to the perfect piece of equipment that is stuck somewhere in the acquisition
process, and not available to the warfighter.
H. SUMMARY
Although the acquisition process can be shortened and made cheaper by
utilizing NDI, there are numerous impediments, challenges and risks that the program
manager must evaluate before making the selection decision. Politics, contracting
difficulties, logistical support issues, problems with culture and communication, test
and evaluation considerations, and user requirements are just come of the areas that
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the program manager must consider. But even with these challenges, advantages
abound and these will be explored in the next chapter.
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IV. BENEFITS OF ACQUISITION OF FOREIGN NDI WEAPON
SYSTEMS
The reduction of risk in a program is ofparamount importance to the program
manager. With the procurement of foreign NDI, the risks to cost, schedule and
performance can be drastically reduced. Since these items have already gone through
an acquisition process that included research and development, test and evaluation
and production, a majority ofthese risks have been mitigated. Procuring foreign NDI
offers the program manager the promise of risk mitigation and a lower risk means of
meeting the armed services' urgent needs and operational requirements. (Steves,
1996, p. 46) This chapter will explore the program risks mitigated by utilizing foreign
NDI in the areas of cost and schedule reduction, test and evaluation and with the use
of the Foreign Comparative Testing (FCT) program.
A. COST REDUCTION
1. Reduced R&D Costs
R&D costs contribute greatly to the overall cost of the system. With NDI
procurement, these R&D costs, although not eliminated, can be shared and the
savings passed on to the end user. This reduction in the R&D requirement shortens
the length of, or eliminates the need for the PDDR and EMD phases. An example of
this is the acquisition of the Mobile Subscriber Equipment (MSE), a tactical
communications system recently acquired by the Army. The MSE, a $4.3 billion
acquisition program, saved over $500 million in R&D costs by utilizing items
generally in production and commercially available. (Norris, 1995, p. 24)
2. Firm Fixed Price Contracts
Since an NDI program normally has more clearly defined requirements than
developmental projects, there is usually less cost, schedule and performance risk
41
associated with the acquisition. "The General Accounting Office (GAO) has noted
that because ofthe reduced risk to the Government, simpler contract procedures can
be used for NDIs. These contract procedures include increased use of fixed-price type
contracts." (Norris, 1995, p. 48) FFP contracts take advantage of competition in the
marketplace, thereby yielding lower costs than other types of contracts. They also
prevent cost overruns associated with cost plus contracts and avoid the significant
delivery risks that are inherent with best effort contracts. (Shade, 1996, p. 5)
B. SCHEDULE
Decreased development cycles and shorter procurement lead times are major
NDI contributors to an overall shortened acquisition fielding time. (Adams, 1992,
p. vii) In an NDI program, if the milestone decision authority approves an NDI
acquisition strategy, the program proceeds, depending on the degree of modification
needed, directly to production (if no modification is needed), or to a combined
Concept Exploration and Program Definition and Risk Reduction phase, called the
Acquisition Documentation phase. In this phase, modifications are designed, made,
integrated, tested and documentation is prepared for the final milestone review prior
to production. (NDI Factsheet 1.5.1-2, 1994, p. 1) This can be accomplished in only
one to two years instead of the five to six years normally required for the CE and
PDDR phases. (Norris, 1995, p. 23)
An example of shortened procurement time in a foreign NDI acquisition is
the M-119 105 mm Field Howitzer program. The U.S. Army wanted an NDI
howitzer that could be fielded as soon as possible. A market survey was conducted
in 1984 and the British Light Gun, the M-119, was selected as the best system. This
howitzer, purchased from the U.K., skipped the CE and EMD phases and abbreviated
the PDDR phase. Also, only limited OT&E testing was necessary because the Ml 19
had been tested previously during its CE phase. The TDP was purchased from the
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U.K. and the howitzer manufactured in the United States. Even with the extensive
problems experienced with the transfer ofthe TDP package from Royal Ordnance to
the U.S. arsenal at Rock Island, Illinois, the Ml 19 went from initial market survey in
January 1984 to first fielding in December 1989. (Shade, 1996, p. 6)
C. PERFORMANCE
The procurement of foreign NDI can shorten schedule, reduce cost, and give
the Services a system that will meet their operational requirements. Foreign NDI
programs introduce the acquisition of mature technologies, with validated and
established production techniques and high quality. Availability, reliability,
maintainability and supportability data are already established and available for
analysis. (Steves, 1995, p. 29)
With NDI, the burden of proof is on the developer to prove that he has a
superior product. DoD benefits by allowing market competition to work. This
ensures a quality product that is priced by market forces. If an NDI's performance
and quality are low, market forces will ensure the demise ofthe product. (Barb, 1987,
p.7)
For the program manager, the best indicator of performance and quality of a
foreign system is its use by the host country's military. Ifthe host country's military
uses and endorses the system, it is an indication that it is a quality system. However,
ifthe item is not used by their military (such as the export model ofthe Soviet T-72),
it is a clear indication that it does not meet the performance needs oftheir military and
probably should not be acquired. (Buying Commercial and NDI: A Handbook, 1996,
P- 3)
D. TEST AND EVALUATION
NDI acquisition allows for previous test and performance data to prove
producer acceptability, suitability, and military operational effectiveness and
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suitability. This data can come from commercial manufactures, users, other Services,
or foreign countries. (Norris, 1995, p. 23) The general guidance for commercial and
NDI acquisitions is to conduct testing only when existing data (contractor or other)
is sufficient. This is a huge benefit for the program manager who must allocate
resources (time and money) towards T&E.
However, as with any program, T&E for an NDI program must fulfill the basic
tenant of risk reduction.
The program must contain enough testing to define risk in terms of
how the system meets the functional specification in the intended
operational environment. The program must adequately define the
system's operational effectiveness and suitability. With risk definition
in hand, the T&E program must met legal requirements, like required
mandatory testing and reporting requirements for milestone decisions.
Given the variety of NDI approaches that may be employed, it is
imperative that the acquisition strategy clearly specifies, with the
agreement of the testing authority, the level of testing that will be
performed onNDI systems and the environment in which those systems
will be tested. (Adams, 1992, p. 35)
With this is in mind, the program manager must, in concert with the
developmental and operational test personnel, develop a plan to ensure the correct
mix of testing is completed while taking advantage of the test data already available.




Obtain and assess contractor test results.
2. Obtain usage/failure data from other customers.
3 Observe contractor testing.




FCT funds support the procurement or lease of foreign test articles and
subsequent test and evaluation by the sponsoring service. Additional goals of the
program are to reduce duplication in research and development, enhance standardiza-
tion and interoperability, improve cooperative support, and promote competition and
desirable international technology exchange. (FCT Homepage, 1996, p.l)
1. Program Advantages
Utilization of the FCT Program allows the DoD to leverage the RDT&E
investments of friendly nations to fulfill our own needs at accelerated program
schedule and reduced cost. (Vanderwerf, 1996, p. 15) A program manager should
to be aware of this program and consider it during the acquisition planning process.
The use ofFCT options could be an avenue to meet mission need while mitigating the
cost, schedule, and performance risks discussed earlier in this chapter. The FCT
Program can capitalize on the benefits of acquiring NDI items, which include the:
* Quick response to operator needs;
* Elimination or reduction of research and development costs;
* Application of state-of-the-art technology to current requirements; and
* Reduction of technology, cost, and schedule risks. (Vanderwerf, 1996,
p. 12)
2. FCT Nomination Process
The nomination of a foreign system for the FCT program must meet a
prescribed set of criteria to ensure that the proposal will be favorably considered for
approval by OSD. To comply with this requirement, each Service and USSOCOM
has established candidate nomination processes to screen their own proposals. Listed
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below are the criteria that must be met for a foreign system to be nominated for OSD
FCT Program support and funding.
* Demonstrate that the system either meets a requirement for which no
U.S. system exists or it provides significant cost, schedule, or perform-
ance benefits over an existing domestic system. This must be suppor-
ted by the completion of a thorough market investigation.
* Insure that there are no offshore procurement restrictions that will
effect the procurement of the item. Also, identify the potential for
establishing a domestic source to manufacture the item.
* Funding must be identified and made available for the foreign item
being nominated.
* Address the willingness of the Service and the foreign government
or industry to share costs.
* "Address: 1) allied interoperability and support considerations, 2)
other DoD components' interests in the item, 3) security concerns, and
4) end-use certification requirements." (Buying Commercial and NDI:
A Handbook, 1996, p. 58)
3. FCT Participation
Approximately 20 countries, to include Kazakhstan, Russia, and the Ukraine
have participated in this program. Some ofthe purchases that the U.S. has made after
testing by this program are the French DURANDAL Runway Attack Weapon,
Australian Transportable Recompression Chamber and the German NBC Recon
Vehicle System. In addition, thirty-one projects have been selected by the Depart-
ment of Defense to receive Fiscal Year 1996 funding. (FCT Homepage, 1996, p. 3)
F. SUMMARY
Cost, schedule and performance risks can be significantly decreased by the use
of foreign NDI as a procurement tool. The established cost structure, minimized
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production start up costs and economies of scale all contribute to minimization of
system risk. The time, cost and performance savings achieved, along with those
associated with test and evaluation and the FCT program make the option of utilizing
foreign NDI to fulfill a requirement very attractive.
47
48
V. MADS ACQUISITION CASE ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an overview and analysis of the acquisition of the
Maritime Air Delivery System (MADS) from a program management perspective.
The focus of this chapter is on key issues that have, or will have an important impact
on the acquisition of the MADS. These key issues will be analyzed within the
context ofthe impediments, challenges and advantages discussed earlier in this thesis.
These issues were derived by interviewing various members of testing agencies and
the USSOCOM FCT office and by analyzing numerous program documents.
B. DESCRIPTION OF THE MADS
1. User Requirements
The requirement for an airdrop insertion capability ofNSW 24 foot RHIBs into
maritime environments came from the Commander of Special Forces, Europe
(SOCEUR). The SOCEUR Commander wanted to improve the effectiveness and
responsiveness of his Special Boat Units (SBUs) to conduct immediate operations.
The current procedure is for equipment and personnel of the SBUs to be transported
by naval craft or ground transportation to their deployment area. Both ofthese modes
of transportation are time consuming, require extensive coordination, and are depen-
dent on another Commander's assets. The SOCEUR Commander identified the
requirement for a system that would allow him to deliver a 24 foot RHIB to a
maritime drop zone quicker and without depending on outside assets. The constraints
imposed on the system are that it must be transportable by C-130 aircraft, using only
unit personnel and be recoverable for training purposes. The intent is that the system
be manned and sustained without depending on another unit or increasing the
manpower of the SBUs. (Phillips, 1996, p. 3)
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2. System Description
"The MADS is an airdrop platform specifically tailored to deliver a RHIB to
a water drop zone in such a manner that the RHIB is immediately ready for use with
little or no derigging required." (TEMP, 1996, p. 3) The MADS is comprised of
three major subsystems: a cradle; extraction, deployment, and main chutes; and a 24
foot RHIB. The cradle is similar in appearance to a boat trailer and is designed to
hold one 24 foot RHIB. (TEMP, 1996, p. 3)
The MADS is loaded into the drop aircraft in the same manner as standard
heavy drop loads. "The rigged system is platform extracted by a drogue parachute;
as the MADS clears the trailing edge ofthe aircraft ramp, an extraction force transfer
device releases the tie downs holding the RHIB to the cradle." (TEMP, 1996, p. 3)
During extraction, the cradle separates from the RHIB and descends under the drogue
parachute, while the RHIB descends under G-12 parachutes. When the cradle impacts
with the water, the main canopies release and the RHIB rides free in the water without
encumbrances to its hull or superstructure. Naval Special Warfare Unit (NSWU)
personnel exit the aircraft immediately following the extraction of the MADS and
follow it to the water drop zone. (TEMP, 1996, p. 3)
The cradle is designed to be sunk in combat operations, eliminating most
telltale debris. By inserting optional floatation devices, the cradle will float,
permitting the system to be used indefinitely for peacetime training missions.
(TEMP, 1996, p. 4)
3. Current Status
Two prototypes have been acquired and recently completed final air worthiness
and air drop certification procedures at the Army's Natick Research Lab. This
certification included modifications to the roller assembly and the completion of
documentation and training plans. The two prototypes were returned to SBU-20 at
50
Little Creek Naval Base, VA in April 1997 in anticipation of scheduled operational
test drops. These airdrops were delayed due to the need to retrain operational
personnel (combat craft crewmen) in required skills (airborne, rigger, etc.), and the
lack of dedicated aircraft support for the missions. The current plan is for a series of
three airdrops to be conducted in summer 1997 to test for operational effectiveness
and suitability requirements. A "proof of concept" phase will be conducted in
September and October 1997 when the two systems are deployed to EUCOM to be
used in support of an operational exercise. (Steinke, 1997)
In May 1997, the MADS will go in front of the USSOCOM Requirements
Review Board (RRB). The RRB will assess, prioritize and recommend to the Board
of Directors (BOD) further action on the MADS. The BOD will either approve the
concept and the MADS will become a "program", or it will disapprove the concept.
If the MADS is given program status, a procurement decision will be made during
summer 1998 after the Integrated Logistics Support Plan (ILSP), test reports, Release
for SOF Use, and the safety certification are completed and briefed to the BOD.
(Steinke, 1997)
C. KEY ISSUES
Key MADS issues will be analyzed against the challenges, impediments and
advantages associated with foreign NDI discussed earlier in this thesis. Some ofthese
issues relate directly to the benefits and challenges discussed in the previous chapters,
while others relate to issues which were not previously examined. Key issues are
categorized for discussion and analysis into the following seven areas.




* Test and Evaluation,
* Affect of the MADS on the Procurement of the 10 meter RHIB,
* Political,
* Establishment ofUSSOCOM FCT Office.
D. ANALYSIS OF KEY ISSUES
1. Formal Acquisition Process
a. Background
On 22 April 1993, the Commander, Special Operations Command,
Europe (SOCEUR) published a Mission Need Statement (MNS) that identified the
need to "tactically insert maritime craft directly into the ocean without having to
depend on aircraft landing first." (TEMP, 1993, p. 1) This MNS was sent to the
Commander, Naval Special Warfare Command (NSWC), Coronado, CA, who is the
proponent for the Special Boat Units. NSWC forwarded the SOCEUR MNS to
USSOCOM at MacDill Air Force Base (AFB), Tampa, FL.
In January 1994, the USSOCOM Requirements Review Board (RRB)
approved the MNS and ranked it 24th on the USSOCOM Integrated Requirement
Priority List (IRPL). USSOCOM then directed NSWC to investigate the feasibility
of adding this capability to the mission ofthe SBUs. (Proposed Acquisition Strategy,
1994, p. 1)
An acquisition strategy was developed by a USSOCOM liaison officer
working at NSWC. The strategy identified the following three major points.
* First, this is a limited acquisition action with only two systems to be
purchased.
* Second, this action addresses a limited interim capability and does not
fulfill the objective MADS requirement.
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• Third, an NDI system with a proven operational history is available and
offers a low risk solution. (Proposed Acquisition Strategy, 1995, p. 3)
The CNSWC identified $1 10,000 in procurement funds to procure the
two systems and $95,000 in Operations and Maintenance (O&M) funds to conduct
associated testing. The proposed acquisition strategy "seeks procurement approval
for a limited capability only. Subsequent procurements are dependent on clarification
of objective RIB (sic) inventories and refinement of MADS operational require-
ments." (Proposed Acquisition Strategy, 1995, p. 6)
A draft Operational Requirements Document for an air dropable RHIB
was developed by SOCEUR and forwarded to CNSWC in January 1995. During the
remainder of 1995, NSWC personnel conducted a market survey (to identify a system
which provided the necessary capabilities), developed a proposed acquisition strategy,
and developed a Test and Evaluation Master Plan. (Steinke, 1997)
The market survey identified the MADS as the only viable option
available. The MADS is produced by Aircraft Materials, LTD (AML), U.K., under
license to the Ministry ofDefence (MOD), U.K. and has been in service with British
SOF for almost ten years. (Proposed Acquisition Strategy, 1995, p. 1)
On 2 February 1996, USSOCOM sent an Out of Cycle Candidate
Nomination Proposal for the MADS to the FCT for consideration. Although FCT
funding was approved, NSWC bought the two test articles with their own O&M funds
so they could meet the proposed DT/OT testing schedule (an important part ofwhich
would be conducted in a combined British and U.S. airborne operation to be
conducted in North Carolina in the spring of 1996). (Steinke, 1997)
b. Discussion andAnalysis
When the Out of Cycle FCT proposal went before OSD, they were
under the assumption that the MADS was already an approved program (the proposal
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included the MNS and a draft ORD). OSD prefers that FCT funds support test and
evaluation in support of a procurement (Milestone III) decision, but also authorizes
funds for concept and development action or technical assessment (Milestone I and
II) decisions. (Steinke, 1997)
This was to be a limited acquisition action with only two systems
purchased, to address a limited interim capability and not completely fulfill the
objective MADS requirement. As stated in their acquisition strategy, NSWC wanted
to use the funds as a technical assessment tool to help them verify and complete their
ORD requirements, versus a procurement decision tool. NSWC's strategy was sound
but may not have been understood by OSD. (Steinke, 1997)
Up to this point, every Command had followed the proper acquisition
process. Problems started when delay in receipt of the FCT funds "forced" NSWC
to purchase the two test articles with their own funds in order to stay on schedule.
Although the FCT funds were approved, they were not available in time for NSWC
to use them. The delay in funding occurred because a system was not in place which
allowed OSD to send USSOCOM RDT&E funds. Nor was there a system which
allowed USSOCOM to receive anything but MFP 1 1 funds (the MADS was the first
FCT funded acquisition for USSOCOM and this situation had never been encountered
before). There were other comptroller associated problems, but the bottom line is it
took seven months for the funds to be received by USSOCOM. (Steinke, 1997)
NSWC purchased the two test articles usingO&M funds, believing they
would be reimbursed with FCT funds at a later date. This did not happen because
NSWC could not accept the RDT&E funds from USSOCOM. FCT funds are
RDT&E funds and NSWC is not chartered to accept this type (color) of funding
because they are not a procurement activity. (Steinke, 1997)
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Prior to the establishment ofUSSOCOM in 1987, NSWC and the other
Services' special operations forces procured items in this fashion. Since the
establishment ofUSSOCOM, this type ofprocurement is not authorized. However,
there is still the "mind set" that this is the way to conduct business. As such, the
Operations shop authorized the expenditure without first checking with the comp-
troller to see if it was appropriate. The end result is thatNSWC cannot be reimbursed
by USSOCOM for the $110,000 it spent on the procurement of the test articles.
(Steinke, 1997)
c. Recommendation
USSOCOM FCT proposal procedures should be clarified to ensure
misunderstandings between OSD and USSOCOM on the status of a nomination are
eliminated. USSOCOM should continue to use the FCT Program to procure test
items and funding for test and evaluation to support their acquisition requirements
in concept and development and procurement.
2. Program Management
a. No Officer-in Charge (OIC) ofAcquisition Effort
(1) Background . An OIC or program manager was not
assigned to the MADS acquisition from the time the MNS was approved in January
1994, (through the procurement and initial testing) until the FCT office was
established in July 1996.
(2) Discussion and Analysis . Prior to the establishment of
the USSOCOM FCT office in July 1996, there was not a dedicated individual or
element organized to deal with foreign NDI and FCT funding. The USSOCOM J3E
was the staff section which had the responsibility for this requirement, but this office
had little experience in dealing with FCT or foreign NDI. When the MNS was
approved by the RRB and it became known thatNSWC was actually going to procure
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test articles, J3E should have tasked aUSSOCOM acquisition element to take the lead
in the acquisition effort (as stated previously, the MADS was the first system that
actually received funding from FCT). As a procurement dealing with maritime
operations, the logical choice should have been to task PEO Maritime and Rotary to
lead the effort. An alternate solution would have been for NAVSEA PMS 340 to
head the effort. (Steinke, 1997)
The USSOCOM FCT office was established in July 1996
as a specific function and responsibility ofthe USSOCOM developmental test officer,
six months after procurement and initial testing of the MADS, and over three years
after the approval ofthe MNS. During this period, no "champion" was appointed to
ensure a complete and adequate assessment process. As a result, money was never
earmarked by USSOCOM to procure the MADS. (Steinke, 1997)
(3) Recommendation . Before the acquisition process starts,
designate an OIC or program manager, with the appropriate responsibility and
authority for all actions. This individual should come from either the Service or
appropriate USSOCOM PEO shop. This individual will provide the experience and
continuity that is critical to program success.
b. Cost, Schedule and Performance
(1) Background . With the procurement of the MADS, the
risks to cost, schedule and performance have been drastically reduced. Since the
MADS has already gone through an acquisition process that included research and
development, test and evaluation and production, a majority of these risks have been
mitigated.
(2) Discussion and Analysis .
(a) Cost . Because ofthe clearly defined requirements,
a FFP contract was utilized for the initial acquisition of the two test articles. The use
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of this type of contract reduced the cost, schedule and performance risks which are
normally associated with cost reimbursable contracts. (FCT CNP, 1996, p. 6)
It is estimated that $1.5 million dollars is necessary
to initiate a U.S. based program to fulfill SOCEUR's requirement. The procurement
and test of the two MADS test articles is estimated to cost approximately $500,000
(of which FCT funds will cover all but the initial $110,000 spent by NSWC to
purchase the two test articles). This is a cost savings of approximately $1.4 million
for USSOCOM. (FCT CNP, 1996, p. 6)
Additional cost savings have been realized by the
use ofFCT funds. Parachutes and associated equipment were bought to support test
and evaluation and can be kept by NSWC following testing to be used as operational
equipment. Also, FCT funds can be used to pay for some TDY costs to support the
"proof of concept" tests in EUCOM. Since these elements will participate anyway,
savings in O&M can be realized. (Steinke, 1997)
(b) Schedule . The decreased development phase
(limited to rigging procedures, rigging equipment and modifications to the side rails
and the roller pads on the cradle) associated with the MADS acquisition is a major
contributor to the shortened acquisition process. If the MADS is given program
status, a procurement decision will be made during summer 1998 after the ILSP, test
reports, Release for SOF Use, and the safety certification are completed and briefed
to the BOD (MDA). This decision is called a Milestone 0/III decision because all
actions that are normally conducted during phases 0, 1, and II, (CE, PDDR, EMD) are
accomplished simultaneously. (Steinke, 1997)
(c) Performance . The MADS is a mature system that
has been in service with U.K. SOF for almost ten years. During this time, there have
been over 100 operational drops without a malfunction. (Proposed Acquisition
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Strategy, 1995, p. 1) As a mature system, availability, reliability, maintainability and
supportability data are already established and available for analysis.
The best performance indicator for NSWC and
USSOCOM is that the U.K. SOF units have used the system for ten years. Host
country military use and endorsement of the system is a clear indication of a quality
system. In fact, during the initial testing by the U.S., the cradle (the part ofthe system
produced by AML) has always functioned properly). The MADS is a proven system
which will satisfy an urgent operational requirement for COMSOCEUR.
(3) Recommendation . Continue to investigate the use of
foreign NDI to satisfy user requirements. The benefits to cost, schedule and
performance (as noted above) can dramatically reduce program risk. Continue to use
the FCT Program to assist in this endeavor, taking advantage of the funds available
for procurement of test articles and test and evaluation.
3. User Requirements
a. Background
Ifthe MADS is designated a program, an Integrated Logistics Support
Plan (ILSP) will be completed prior to the MS O/III (procurement) decision. This
ELSP will contain a section which addresses Human Resource and Manpower issues.
The requirement in the MNS for autonomous operation of the MADS without
affecting current manpower will be a critical issue to be analyzed during the execution
of the ILSP. (Steinke, 1997)
Combat Craft Crewman (CCC), Naval Enlisted Classification 9533,
operate various equipment within NSWC, to include three types ofRHIBs and the
MARK V Special Operations Craft. The RHIBs are deployed in detachments
consisting of two boats each. The 24 foot RHIB detachment is manned with six
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crewmen (three per craft), consisting of a detachment OlC/coxswain and two each
crew/operator per craft. (Phillips, 1996, p. 5)
b. Discussion andAnalysis
With the current requirement from SOCEUR ofautonomous operations,
additional skill requirements for MADS personnel will expand tremendously. At a
minimum, each crew member will need to be both static line and military free fall
(MFF) qualified to meet the intent of the SOCEUR Commander. In addition, one
member of the three man crew must become qualified in the following areas:
* Jumpmaster (both static line and MFF).
* Military Parachute Rigger (both personnel and equipment).
* Equipment Specialist (MFF specific equipment). (Phillips, 1996, p. 7)
Although the previous skill requirements can be achieved, there are several
impediments which impact on their success. These impediments are discussed next.
1 . The additional skills requirement requires a revision to
the initial and annual training requirements for each crew member. To modify the
existing training forecast anywhere in the pipeline impacts the number of crewmen
available for duty. In addition, the aforementioned skills are difficult and most have
a high training attrition rate. The probability of increased attrition rates as the trainee
progressed through required training would cause an automatic increase in the number
required to graduate from the basic Combat Crewman Course. (Phillips, 1996, p. 8)
Another challenge is getting the crewmen assigned to
MADS equipped detachments (two craft per detachment) trained in these additional
skills. Detachments would need to rotate through a "stand down period" during
which the crewmen would have to become qualified in static line parachuting,
followed by MFF (once the required number of static line jumps has been made).
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Selected crewmen would then be required to become qualified in the other skills
previously mentioned. This would take an extensive period of time (six months,
assuming all personnel pass these schools on a first time basis, which is unlikely), and
impact on the other detachments by increasing their deployment times and creating
mission shortfalls. (Phillips, 1996, p. 8)
2. Another problem is obtaining the quotas for the required
schools. Each required skill is taught at an Army installation within the Training and
Doctrine Command (TRADOC). Obtaining the required quotas necessary to support
this requirement will impact other Services by increasing the number of instructors




The added sustainment training requirements detract from
mission skills. The amount ofsustainment training required for each skill ranges from
a single static linejump required every quarter to approximately a month's worth of
certification training required per year for MFF operations. With the addition of the
MADS specific skill requirements, deterioration will occur in the other required skill
areas, affecting the unit's combat effectiveness. (Phillips, 1996, pp. 9-12)
All of the aforementioned impediments have a cost
associated with them which must be considered in the overall life cycle cost of the
MADS. The increase in the number ofrecruits will increase manpower costs, and the
costs ofthe initial and sustainment training. There is also the added cost of incentive
pay associated with the new skills.
Although the initial procurement and maintenance costs
of a MADS are very low, the life cycle costs associated with training and maintaining
the crewmen's additional skills make the acquisition of the MADS (as the MNS is
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written) impractical for the Services. There are, however, other manpower options
that meet the MADS operational requirements and these are discussed next.
Manpower Option . The following is an option which
would satisfy the mission requirement of deploying a RHIB, but not satisfy the MNS
requirement of autonomous operations. Army and Air Force units and personnel
assigned to EUCOM have the necessary skills to conduct the tasks the crewmen are
now being asked to perform (jumpmaster, rigger, etc.). These personnel are available
to support this type of mission and would require little train-up on MADS specific
equipment (the 1/10 SFG(A) is stationed in Stuttgart, Germany, along with the
NSWU and has rigger personnel who could easily support this mission). Having the
Army perform these tasks reduces the additional skill requirements for the crewmen
to only static line and MFF parachuting. (Steinke, 1997)
Depending on how tactics, techniques and procedures
drive the requirements for the crewmen, the MFF qualification may not be required.
For example, the results from the operational tests and the EUCOM exercise may
dictate that the MADS will be dropped from low altitude, negating the requirement
of MFF qualification for the crewmen. (Steinke, 1997)
As stated in Chapter III, requirements generation is
possibly the most critical step in the acquisition process. As the MADS case
illustrates, the failure ofSOCEUR and NSWC (the users) to conduct an analysis of
the human resource issues may have a serious impact on the procurement ofthis item.
c. Recommendation
The need to think joint or "purple" is particularly important in this
situation because the Navy cannot afford to acquire the MADS with the current
requirement for autonomous operations. The Army and Air Force already have the
skills required to support this mission. Because of the manpower and cost impedi-
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ments discussed earlier, they should be tasked to support this mission. The Navy
crewmen should acquire the minimum additional skills required to conduct this
operation. Redundant skills cost money and CINCEUR already has the required
skills to meet the requirement.
4. Test and Evaluation Issues
a. Background
(1) Prior Test Information . The British version of the
MADS has been in service with U.K. SOF for almost ten years where it has been used
to drop their 8 meter RHIBs. There have been over 100 operational drops without a
system malfunction. (Proposed Acquisition Strategy, 1995, p. 1)
The British system uses U.K. rigging procedures and
rigging equipment. However, NSWC requires the use of U.S. standard rigging
procedures and equipment to minimize the logistical impact and meet U.S. safety
standards. This requires the development of new rigging procedures using U.S.
standard items. Natick Laboratories indicated that this is feasible and have identified
no potential problems. (Proposed Acquisition Strategy, 1995, p. 3)
The cradle system requires a modification to the side rails
and roller pads and the manufacturer has offered a product improvement as a
modification solution. With these modifications, the system should be compatible
with U.S. aircraft. However, testing of this modification will be an important aspect
of the airdrop certification process. (Proposed Acquisition Strategy, 1995, p. 3)
The U.K. will be the data source for establishing
operational suitability of the system. The baseline will be validated by subsequent
operational testing. OT&E will incorporate testing by the Ministry ofDefense (U.K.)
and a two phase user test conducted by NSWC units. (TEMP, 1996, p. 2)
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(2) Developmental and Operational Testing
(a) Test 1 . The MADS first combined DT/OT was
conducted at Hurlburt Field on 25 January, 1996.
As the load was extracted from the aircraft, a malfunction of the boat
recovery system occurred (22* deployment parachute prematurely fell
off the load due to inertia of the parachute). The 22' RS appeared to
somewhat hang up on the load and was not properly deployed or
inflated (video was poor quality). One of the releasable static lines
released properly but internally (sic) while the other did not release,
causing some damage to the aircraft. The load exited properly and the
cradle separated from the boat as designed. The recovery parachutes
to the cradle deployed properly and the cradle was recovered. The boat
free fell for about 1000' before one G-12 was aero-deployed. After
another 1000', another G-12 deployed. The boat was successfully
recovered by the two G-12s. (Chan, Trip Report, 1996, p. 1)
During post malfunction review, other malfunc-
tions were found which include tearing and friction burns to equipment and
entanglements of G-12 parachutes. The Natick engineer recommended that further
DT/OT testing be postponed until additional developmental testing was completed.
However, the Navy and USAF (C-130 aircrew) decided to continue testing pending
approval by Systems Command and Air Combat Command (ACC). The ACC
operates combat-coded fighters, bombers, tankers, and reconnaissance aircraft. ACC
had concerns for aircrew and aircraft safety and subsequently withdrew approval for
testing of the MADS on C-130 aircraft. (Chan, 1997)
(b) Test II and III . A meeting was held on 12 FEB
1996 at Virginia Beach, VA to resolve airdrop concerns regarding the MADS.
Participants included NSWC, Natick, 18FTS/TO (C-130 unit) and ACC personnel.
At the meeting, all problems were resolved to the satisfaction of the participants and
a revised Proposed Test Plan was approved. IPRs were conducted between the
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different organizations to work out any other problems. (Chan, Trip Report, 1996,
p.D
The Defense Evaluation Support Agency (DESA)
was selected to conduct the remaining operational test and evaluation. A second
DT/OT test was conducted at Little Creek Naval base in early spring and verified the
changes made to the rigging and extraction. On 2 May 1996, the first MADS OT
drop was conducted at Port Royal, SC. According to DESA, the airdrop was
"flawless." (Merrit, 1996, p. 1)
b. Discussion andAnalysis
(1) Problems and Impediments Encountered . There was
an assumption by both the user and the sponsor that the testing would be a very
straight forward process. Slight modifications would be made to the MADS and
rigging procedures, and the system would be pushed out of the back of a U.S. C- 130
without complications.
However, this was not the case. The British system uses
an entirely different and incompatible means of extraction (extraction by main
parachute). A replication of the U.K. approach, was not an option due to U.S. airdrop
procedures. Consequently, Natick personnel had to design a unique means to extract
and deploy the recovery parachutes. This was not NDI, this was developmental
airdrop and the technical risk was considerable. When the requirement was given to
Natick at the beginning of 1995, it was given to someone with little SOF airdrop
experience and put on the "back burner" due to its unfunded status. It was also
treated as a standard certification effort when it was really developmental airdrop. A
new engineer assigned to the MADS in December 1995 investigated and highlighted
the problems associated with the developmental airdrop. The user and sponsor were
warned of this problem in January 1996, but because of the late date, they were not
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interested in hearing about potential show stoppers, and the testing was conducted as
scheduled. (Chan, 1997)
Test 1 . Problems occurred during the combined DT/OT
conducted at Hurlburt Field. Due to time and resource constraints, developmental
testing was not completed at an adequate developmental test location, such as Yuma
Proving Grounds (YPG), prior to the testing at Hurlburt Field. The extraction and
deployment system should have been tested prior to it being used on the actual load,
but it was not. Instead a combination DT/OT was conducted, which may have been
appropriate for a true NDI acquisition, but was not appropriate in this situation. The
end result was a failure of the system to deploy correctly. As a result of this failure,
a C-130 aircraft was slightly damaged. (Chan, 1997)
This failure occurred because there was not a positive way
to release the deployment parachute. Initially, a non-breakaway static line, whose
metal components beat against the plane, was used. The problem was solved by using
a releasable static line, which is a non-fielded item. This could have been avoided if
appropriate testing of an extraction system was certified prior to the actual
operational test. (Chan, 1 997)
Video support was poor at Hurlburt Field during this
critical testing. Film crews with no real airdrop experience were used to film the test.
Consequently, after the initial malfunction, there was little video evidence of what
went wrong. A T&E site (such as YPG) would have had professional video support,
which is absolutely necessary for post mortems. The engineers had to guess on a fix
to the problem; luckily it worked. (Chan, 1997)
Both the Navy (driven by operational considerations) and
the USAF (aircrews) decided to pursue additional testing despite the test results and
concerns ofthe Natick engineer. At this point in time, no one was clearly in charge
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ofthe program. If it was pure DT, the engineers from Natick would have been calling
the shots, but it wasn't, and they weren't. The Commander of SBU-20 finally took
charge ofthe operation and due to the need for expediency, the decision to go forward
with another test flight was made. ACC's concern for its aircrews and aircraft were
well founded and they made the correct decision to cancel testing until a viable test
plan could be proposed. (Chan, 1997)
(2) Advantages . As stated in Chapter IV, a large advantage
for foreign NDI in test and evaluation is the use ofprevious test and performance data
from other countries to prove military operational effectiveness and suitability. In this
case, the U.K. data was the source for establishing operational suitability of the
system. Since the basic system is a mature, well proven design, only a limited
number of issues needed to be examined to validate the system. These issues include
the modifications made for DASH 4A compatibility and validation of both air items
and draft rigging procedures using U.S. equipment. All the testing required by the
manufacturer and the U.K., e.g., the suitability of the cradle, did not have to be
replicated by the U.S.
c. Recommendations
Test requirements must be ascertained and confirmed prior to
determining the test assets and resources required. If developmental testing is
required, it is imperative that it occur prior to combined developmental and
operational testing. Ifthe need for developmental testing is a prerequisite for viable
and safe operational testing, it must be conducted to ensure a safe and worthwhile
operational test. The urgency to meet schedule should never outweigh safety issues.
USSOCOM units should continue to leverage the inherent advantages
of testing foreign NDI. The reduction of required tests decreases schedule time and
cost for the program.
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5. Effect ofMADS on the Procurement of the 10 Meter RHIB
a. Background
NSWC is in the process ofprocuring a 10 meter RHIB as a replacement
for the 24 foot RHIB currently in the inventory. The 10 meter RHIB program is an
established program, with the first unit fielded in summer 1998. The 10 meter RHIB
has no airdrop requirement in its ORE). (Steinke, 1997)
b. Discussion andAnalysis
The requirement for a MADS capability is a top priority for
COMSOCEUR, who has revalidated the requirement three times in the last three
years. SOCCENT has also come on line and validated this requirement, bringing the
total number of required systems to 16. Since the 10 meter RHIB is not air dropable,
these SOCs will need to maintain a certain portion of their 24 foot RHIBs instead of
replacing them with the new 10 meter RHIB. (Steinke, 1997)
There are no procurement dollars for MADS identified in the current
POM. However, the USSOCOM J8 (Comptroller) stated that he would decrement
the 10 meter RHIB program to pay for the procurement of the MADS. This funding
would be available due to the reduced number of 10 meter RHIBs required due to the
retention of24 foot RHIBs. NSWC will brief the full repercussions of this action at
the next RRB. (Steinke, 1997)
The RRB will staff this issue to the theater CINCs and to the
USSOCOM service components prior to their recommendation to the Board of
Directors. It is possible that other elements will want this capability, expanding the
basis of issue plan. (Steinke, 1997)
c. Recommendation
USSOCOM's mission is to support the theater CINCs and their
requirements. To do this the 24 foot RHIB must be retained for the required number
67
of detachments. Since funds are not identified in the current POM, 10 meter RHIB
funds (which would have been used to procure these craft for the CINC's) should be
decremented to ensure funding for the procurement of the MADS.
6. Political
a. Background
As stated earlier, Congress is the major force behind impediments
toward free trade. To counter this, foreign lobbies pressure Congress to rebut
isolationist policies and support international trade. They argue that the procurement
ofweapon systems should be done on a best value basis.
Since each FCT project is funded by Congress by individual line item,
each project has visibility and potential interest by Congress even before program
designation. This visibility affords the foreign lobbyist the opportunity to influence
the funding and procurement decision.
b. Discussion andAnalysis
The analysis of the MADS identified no specific political issues that
impacted its acquisition. However, issues did surface that are pertinent to the future
procurement of foreign NDI by USSOCOM and are discussed next.
Foreign corporations and countries are aware that USSOCOM has
limited requirements and that most contracts will be neither large nor extremely
profitable. However, they believe that U.S. special operations forces are the premiere
SOF in the world, and ifthey can get USSOCOM to procure their products, they can
use this fact as a huge selling point when trying to market their product to other
foreign SOFs. Because of this, political ramifications can be way out ofproportion
to the amount ofmoney spent on the FCT programs. (Steinke, 1997)
Most ofthe foreign corporations conducting business with USSOCOM
have lobbyists in Washington, D.C. Theirjob is to promote their respective programs
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to Congress. For example, BOFORS of Sweden has a full time lobbyist in D.C.
whose only job is to promote the Joint Ranger, Anti-armor, Anti-personnel Weapon
System (JRAAWS) Phase II program to Congress. This lobbyist was able to get two
million dollars specifically "earmarked" for the JRAWWS Phase II program,
something neither the program manager nor the FCT Program office was able to
accomplish. This type of influence can also work against USSOCOM. There are
examples where pressure from foreign corporations or countries prolong programs
that, according to some sources at USSOCOM, should be terminated, but due to
intervention, remain alive. (Steinke, 1997)
Besides lobbyists, foreign countries and corporations have other means
available to influence Congress or other acquisition officials. Their embassies can
contact the State Department, Ministers of Defense can contact the Secretary of
Defense, and representatives can contact the FCT office or contact the Under
Secretary for Defense (Acquisition and Technology). These types of actions have
occurred and will continue occur in the future. The challenge to the program manager
is to understand these external forces and devise a strategy to take advantage or
counter them. (Steinke, 1997)
c. Recommendation
As stated above, the program manager must devise a strategy to take
advantage of these forces or counter them. To do this, he must understand the
political issues associated with his program and be sensitive to the realities of foreign
NDI procurement. Those issues that are pertinent to his program must be analyzed
and their effect continuously monitored during program concept, development and
execution.
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7. Establishment ofUSSOCOM FCT Office
a. Background
The FCT Program was established in 1987 to help facilitate the testing
and procurement of foreign NDI items. Since that time, the separate Services have
created their own FCT offices to coordinate this function. The USSOCOM FCT
office was established in July 1997 as a functional responsibility under the Develop-
mental Test Office. Every year, the Services' special operations components identify
foreign systems or items that might satisfy a validated SOF requirement and submit
them to the USSOCOM FCT office prior to formal submission to OSD. (Steinke,
1997)
b. Discussion andAnalysis
Although the USSOCOM FCT office was established after the start of
the MADS acquisition process, it has been the catalyst that has kept the program alive
and on track. It is expected to have a positive effect on future foreign NDI
procurements as well.
The USSOCOM FCT officer has developed a Candidate Nomination
Proposal process (which is similar to the other Services) which identifies criteria that
must be met for submission of the item to OSD for FCT approval and funding. By
following this process, the Services' special operations forces will be able to
accurately identify those items which meet the criteria and will be eligible for
consideration. (Steinke, 1997)
There is currently only one FCT officer (who, with his normal duties,
can only dedicate 30 percent of his time to FCT), along with a contract civilian (paid
for with FCT funds) to perform all the necessary functions. The Services have FCT
shops with anywhere from 4 to 9 personnel assigned. Currently, the USSOCOM FCT
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office is utilizing 25 percent ofavailable FCT Program funds, while having 50 percent
or fewer personnel assigned compared with the Services. (Steinke, 1997)
The FCT Program allowed USSOCOM and NSWC to utilize funds to
test and procure the MADS, provided that the comptroller issues were settled. These
funds help leverage the RDT&E investments of our allies and satisfy our own needs
at a reduced cost and accelerated program schedule. Risks to cost, schedule and
performance were mitigated because of the use of the FCT funds.
c. Recommendation
The Candidate Nomination Proposal (CNP) must be adopted and used
by USSOCOM units to ensure a streamlined submission process. Additional person-






USSOCOM program managers and other acquisition professionals are faced
with the challenge of quickly obtaining quality equipment at an affordable cost.
Procuring NDI weapon systems from foreign sources is one way in which
USSOCOM is attempting to outfit its units quickly while combating the procurement
shortfalls brought on by the recent decreases in funding levels.
In an effort to provide program managers with information about foreign NDI,
this thesis presented an overview of factors that impact procurement of foreign NDI.
These factors included developing a common foundation ofknowledge by examining
the U.S. history of procuring foreign weapon systems and NDI from 1933 to the
present; examining the current policies and directives which affect the acquisition of
foreign weapon systems for SOF; and examining the impediments, challenges and
benefits of acquiring foreign NDI for SOF. A case analysis was completed on the
current USSOCOM acquisition ofthe MADS. The focus of this analysis was on key
issues that had, or will have, an important impact on the acquisition of the MADS.
B. CONCLUSIONS
There are certainly many challenges and impediments to the procurement of
foreign NDI. However, by following established guidelines and utilizing the FCT
Program, the risks to cost, schedule and performance can be drastically reduced.
Procuring foreign NDI offers the program manager a lower risk means ofmeeting the
CINCs' urgent needs and operational requirements.
The MADS acquisition strategy, although not perfect, was sufficient to obtain
and test a viable weapon system while mitigating the risks associated with cost,
schedule and performance. Problems encountered during the process have been
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identified and organizational and administrative changes have been made to correct
these deficiencies.
USSOCOM must continue to leverage the benefits of foreign NDI procure-
ment. With the establishment of the USSOCOM FCT office, USSOCOM has
established the framework needed to ensure that a streamlined and productive process
is followed by its subordinate units.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Before the acquisition process officially begins, an OIC should be
designated with the responsibility for all actions and the appropriate
authority to back it up.
2. USSOCOM should continue to investigate the use of foreign NDI to
satisfy user requirements. They should utilize the FCT Program to
procure test items and fund test and evaluation to support their
acquisition requirements in concept development and procurement.
3. Army and Air Force personnel and units assigned to EUCOM should
perform the extra tasks needed to operationally deploy the MADS. The
Navy crewmen should only acquire the minimum skills required (static
line and MFF).
4. Test requirements must be ascertained prior to determining test assets
and resources required. If developmental testing is required, it is
imperative that it occur prior to combined DT/OT.
5
.
The 24 foot RHIB should be retained to support the required number of
detachments that need the MADS capability. Since funds have not
been identified in the current POM, 10 meter RHIB funds (which
would have been used to procure these craft) should be decremented to
ensure funding for the procurement of the MADS.
6. The program manager must understand the political issues which
impact on his program and devise a strategy to deal with them. Those
issues that are pertinent to his program must be analyzed and their
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effect continuously monitored during program concept, development
and execution.
7. The Candidate Nomination Proposal system should be adopted to
ensure a streamlined submission process for USSOCOM units. The
personnel strength of the USSOCOM FCT office should be increased
so as to better leverage the advantages of the FCT Program.
D. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
The following areas are recommended for further research:
1. Risk Management
A large NDI procurement, such as the M9 Baretta, should be selected and a
risk management analysis conducted to determine the actual reduction in cost,
schedule, and performance risk.
2. Cost-Benefit
An in-depth analysis of the cost of the FCT Program versus the benefits
realized from actual procurements should be conducted to determine the cost-benefit
ratio (i.e., FCT program has financed over 300 procurements and tests, but only 60
items were actually procured for final use).
3. World-Wide Acceptance
An analysis on how foreign countries view the FCT Program should be
conducted to ascertain if there is reluctance by foreign countries and companies to
utilize this program. Is there a reluctance to use this program due to an assumed bias
by U.S. engineers against foreign systems? Is there a fear oftechnology leveling by
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